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Abstract
This paper proposes a way to allocate students to schools such that conciliates
Pareto eﬃciency and stability. Taking as a starting point the recent reform
proposed by the Boston School Committee, we propose a marginal modiﬁcation
to reach our objective redeﬁne how students are prioritize. Our proposal is to
allow schools to prioritize only a small set of students an then use a common
priority order for the rest. Under this condition we propose a score based priority
ranking that makes the output of the new Boston Mechanism Pareto eﬃcient
and stable.
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1 Introduction
On the school choice procedures the way municipalities decide the design in-
strument to allocate student to schools play a key role. In this instruments
the municipalities are forced to establish priorities in order to allow break the
ties that arise when the system takes into account the parents' interests for the
schools. In this present paper we deal with way in which the schools' priority
lists are built. We propose a conditions on agents' characteristics that solve
the eﬃciency-equity trade oﬀ by proposing a priority structure able to reconcile
eﬃciency and stability.
Municipalities use diﬀerent criteria to build priority as preference for, oth-
erwise indiﬀerent, centers. When the list of criteria that provides priorities to
students is not enough to break all relevant ties the municipalities are forced to
use a sort of random process to break the ties.
Even though the criteria used by the schools to prioritize students can be
seen as eﬃciency criteria, the realization of the procedure, to match students and
schools' places, could induce ineﬃcient allocations. This is due to the particular
procedure employed to allocate the schools' places among the students.
In this sense, we can mainly ﬁnd two systems: The centralized ones, that
focus on stability, and the decentralized ones, focusing on Pareto eﬃciency. The
mechanism used in the Boston area, from 2005, can be seen as a representative
example for the ﬁrst one, whereas the Boston mechanism, used in the same
area until that date, is a representative example for the second one. The reader
can ﬁnd a description for both mechanisms in the survey by Sönmez and Ünver
(2009). In this paper we concentrate on the former, the Student-Optimal Sta-
ble mechanism, (SOSM hence for) which coincides with the realization of the
deferred acceptance algorithm in which students send proposals to the schools.
This mechanism, introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962), always selects a sta-
ble allocation. Moreover, all the students (weakly) prefer this allocation to any
other stable allocation. Furthermore, when this mechanism is use, students have
no interest on acting strategically.
Along with the Boston area the redesign that has been introduced in several
markets have presented the SOSM as the best option for school markets, i.e. for
one sided-markets with indiﬀerences. However, the fact this mechanism is, in
general, not eﬃcient has trouble scholars (see Kesten, 2010 and Abdulkadiro§lu,
Patha, and Roth, 2009). In general it can be shown that the welfare lost due to
select the SOSM can be large. There has been several attends to address this
problem. In general this attempts accommodate any preexisting priority struc-
ture by allowing a ﬁnal allocation that relax some priorities in order to achieve
eﬃciency (see Kesten, 2010) or allows the agents to trade their initially stable
endowments until reaching an allocation that can not be justiﬁably objected by
any student (see Alcalde and Romero-Medina, 2010). In any of those attempts
the initial priority structure is, at some point, either modify or ignored. In
both case it seem a better design approach to build a priority structure that
reconciles eﬃciency and stability rather than impose priorities that will impose
eﬃciency lost or, ultimately, will be relax or ignore.
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The usual way to prioritize students in most school districts to establish
priorities comes from the use of a scoring rule. In practical terms the way to deal
with the problem of how students would be prioritized is solved by municipalities
building a function that associates each student a score for each school. This
function often depends on two classes of variables: the relationship between
the student and each school includes and the student's characteristics that are
not related to any school. Among the ﬁrst, are the distance from the student's
residence to the school; and the number of siblings, already attending to the
school. Among the second group we can mention the household income, the
student's household size or the presence of any health condition. Further more,
this criteria is based on continuous variables that are transform into discrete
counterparts in order to be processed. For instance the distance to school is a
continuous criteria that is transform into a discrete one using attendance area
boundaries that deﬁnes the schools in which each students will be prioritized
based on her address. By its deﬁnition the School Attendance Area Policies
assign the same score to students in the same area and forces the procedure to
relay on a lottery drawn to build strict priority list.
In our model, we do not assume any particular geographical distribution
of students and/or schools, we will assume that schools' priority lists need not
to be correlated and each school might exhibit any priority list. This is why,
throughout this paper claim that each school is free to decide how it prioritizes
the students. Accordingly, we refer the policy of accurately redesigning each
school attendance area as schools limited freedom to prioritize the students. In
this paper we show that eﬃciency and equity are compatible if we proceed as
follows: Let us consider two classes of priority lists, namely the local and the
school lists. Then, for a given school, its priority list is used to prioritize (at
most) as much students as it can accept. These students will have priority over
any other student. The remaining students are prioritized by following the local
committee's list. Following this approach, the general recommendation of this
paper is to restrict, for each school, the number of students belonging to its
inﬂuence area. Therefore, what the Local School Committees would do is to
redesign their school attendance areas.
Following, Abdulkadiro§lu et al. (2006), the recent reforms in the alloca-
tion mechanisms lies on avoiding the possibility of students' strategic behavior.
What it seems to be relevant when designing a mechanism for school allocation
problems is to accurately combine stability, eﬃciency and strategy-proofness.
Let us notice that restricting the possible priority lists that schools can pro-
pose, our results point out that the use of the new mechanism in the Boston
Area always selects stable and eﬃcient allocations and this mechanism is fully
strategy-proof1, i.e. not only students have no interest on misrepresenting their
preferences, but it should be also expected that schools do not prioritize students
in a wrong way.2
1The result follows from Alcalde and Barberà (1994)
2In Valencia, Spain, the admission process is similar to the Boston mechanism. The schools
prioritize students according to a scoring function that is established by law. Nevertheless,
the score that a school assigns to a student is evaluated by the school, and it is not monitored
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As Ergin (2002) shows the conditions that reconciles stability and Pareto
eﬃciency are very stringent and involves check the preferences and priorities of
agents in both sides of the market. In particular, if each student is free to rank
any school as her best school, it is always possible to ﬁnd non-scarce problems
having a stable and Pareto eﬃcient matching. Therefore, if conditions are es-
tablished on individual characteristics, it is very hard to have in mind natural
necessary conditions guaranteeing the existence of a stable and Pareto eﬃcient
matching. Our work is closely related to Ergin (2002) and latter extended by
Elhers and Erdil (2010) . They characterize priority structures under which
the constrained eﬃcient assignments are eﬃcient. Our proposal diﬀers from
theirs in the fact that we explore the possibility to propose score based priority
rankings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic
framework and provides some deﬁnitions which are classical in the literature.
Section 3 explores conditions on agents' characteristics under which eﬃcient
and stable allocations exist. Our conclusions point out a general diﬃculty to
conciliate both concepts. This diﬃculty advices us that we should shift the focus
on how the allocation problem could be solved. The solution could be found in
a reconsideration on how the schools give priorities to the students. We propose
a general formulation that can be used as a new way to discuss how the system
should be reformed. The way in which this mechanism is described points out
how the actual Boston system might be re-reformed. Conclusions are gathered
to Section 4. Finally, all the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The School Allocation Problem
The School Allocation Problem family of problems faces two set of non-empty
disjoint agents to be called Students and Schools. The set of Students is denoted
by S, and has n individuals, i.e. S = {s1, . . . , si, . . . , sn}. The set of Schools is
denoted by C, and has m elements, i.e. C = {c1, . . . , cj , . . . , cm}.
Each school has a number of seats (or places), to be distributed among the
students, that will be called its capacity. Let qcj ≥ 1 denote school cj 's capacity;
and let Q =
{
qc1 , . . . , qcj , . . . , qcm
}
the vector summarizing schools' capacities.
Schools are also endowed a priorities linear ordering over the set of students.
Let picj ∈ <n be the students' ordering for school cj and Π the (m× n)-matrix
summarizing these priorities. Formally, picj is described as a n-dimensional
vector such that for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n} there is a unique student si for which
picjsi = k; given this description, the j-th row for matrix Π coincides with vector
picj .
Note that, under our description, no school would consider a student to be
inadmissible. Notice that most of the legislative norms impose such a restriction
in the way that the schools rank their potential students. Nevertheless, our
model might capture the possibility of a student to be inadmissible at a low
by the local administration. This lack of monitoring allows the schools to favor some students.
This behavior can be interpreted as a manipulation by some schools administrators.
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cost: just by introducing a new variable for each school deﬁning the priority
level of the last admissible student.
On the other side, each student has linear preferences over the set of schools,
so that no student will consider two diﬀerent schools as equivalent (or indiﬀer-
ent), and no school is neither considered as inadmissible by any student. Let
ρsi denote the schools' ranking induced by student si's preferences,
3 and Φ
the (n×m)-matrix summarizing these rankings. Note that our model assumes
that each student considers all the school as admissible.4 Nevertheless, we can
also reformulate this model by assuming that each student might consider some
schools as unacceptable. The essence of this paper is the same in both frame-
works.
Therefore, a School Allocation Problem can be described by listing the el-
ements above: SAP = {S, C; Φ,Π, Q}. We will say that a School Allocation
Problem is non-scarce whenever there is enough places to allocate all the stu-
dents ∑
cj∈C
qcj ≥ n.
Given a School Allocation Problem, SAP, a solution for it is an application
µ that matches students and schools' places. Such a correspondence is called a
matching. Formally,
Deﬁnition 1 A matching for SAP, a School Allocation Problem, is a corre-
spondence µ, applying S ∪ C into itself, such that:
(a) For each si in S, if µ (si) 6= si, then µ (si) ∈ C;
(b) For each cj in C, µ (cj) ⊆ S, and |µ (cj)| ≤ qcj ; 5 and
(c) For each si in S, and any cj in C, µ (si) = cj if, and only if, si ∈ µ (cj).
The central solution concept used through the literature is stability, as de-
ﬁned by Balinski and Sönmez (1999). This stability notion coincides with the
pair-wise stability introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). Under our consider-
ations (i.e., each school is acceptable for any student and vice versa), stability
is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 A matching for SAP, say µ, is said stable if there is no student-
school pair (si, cj) such that
(a)µ (si) = si, or ρsicj < ρsiµ(si); and
(b) |µ (cj)| < qcj , or picjsi < picjsh for some sh ∈ µ (cj).
Throughout this paper, we adopt the convention that ρsiµ(si) = m+ 1 whenever
µ (si) = si.
3I.e., ρsicj = 3 indicates that student si considers that cj is her third-best school.
4Here, we can also invoke legislative regulations establishing that school attendance is
compulsory for the children of certain ages.
5Throughout this paper |T | will denote the cardinality of set T .
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The idea of instability comes basically from the notion of justiﬁed envy. (See
Haeringer and Klijn, 2009). Let us consider a matching µ, and let us assume
that student si prefers to study at school cj rather that developing her educative
formation at her actual school µ (si). If si has a priority higher than that of
some of the actual students attending school cj , or this school is still having
some vacant, she might claim that the allocation process has been unfair.
A second notion that has also been analyzed in this framework is that of
eﬃciency. To introduce appropriately this concept, let us remember that the
only role for the schools is to provide educational services needed by the students.
Therefore the natural notion of eﬃciency, as proposed by Balinski and S'onmez
(1999) for this framework, is Pareto eﬃciency (from the students' point of view).
Deﬁnition 3 Given a School Allocation Problem, SAP, we say that matching
µ is Pareto eﬃcient if for any other matching µ′ there is a student, say si, such
that
ρsiµ(si) < ρsiµ′(si).
Note that, for any non-scarce School Allocation Problem, stability and/or
eﬃciency of a matching µ implies that, for each student si, µ (si) ∈ C.
A matching mechanism is a regular procedure that associates to each School
Allocation Problem a matching for such a problem. A matching mechanismM
is said to be stable if, for any given problem, it always selects a stable matching.
Similarly, we say that a matching mechanism is Pareto eﬃcient whenever its
outcome is always Pareto eﬃcient, related to its input. It is easy to see that there
are stable matching mechanisms. In fact, any of the versions of the deferred-
acceptance algorithms proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) associates a stable
matching for the related School Allocation Problem. On the other hand, the
now-or-never mechanism introduced by Alcalde (1996) always selects a Pareto
eﬃcient matching when the proposals are made by the students.6
It is a well known result that it might be an impossible task to conciliate
stability and Pareto eﬃciency, i.e. there is no matching mechanism selecting a
stable and Pareto eﬃcient allocation for each School Allocation Problem. In the
next section we seek the existence of natural conditions on Φ and Π guaranteeing
the existence of matching mechanisms being stable and Pareto eﬃcient.
3 On the existence of stable and Pareto eﬃcient
allocations
In this section we explore natural conditions under which stability and Pareto
eﬃciency are compatible for some matching mechanisms. Given that set of
stable matchings has a lattice structure and one of its extremes can be reached by
applying the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. Therefore, the
6The now-or-never mechanism is also known as the Boston mechanism because it was used
in the Boston school district.
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unique stable matching mechanism that could eventually be Pareto eﬃcient is
the so called Student-Optimal Stable mechanism. The question is whether on the
framework of the school choice problem are conditions able to encompass both
the uses of school districts on the priorities matrices under which the students
optimal stable matching is always eﬃcient. To provide a positive answer to the
above question, let us consider the following condition on schools' priorities:
Deﬁnition 4 We say that the schools' priorities matrix Π satisﬁes the Com-
mon Priorities Condition , CPC in short, if, and only if, there is a (ﬁxed)
relation of students' priorities, pi = (pis1 , . . . , pisi , . . . , pisn), such that for each
school cj, and `preferred set of students' for such a school, S
j ⊆ S, with∣∣Sj∣∣ ≤ qsj , its priority relation satisﬁes:
(a) picjsi ≤ qcj , for each si ∈ Sj; and
(b) picjsi =
∣∣Sj∣∣+ ∣∣{sh ∈ S \ Sj : pish ≤ pisi}∣∣, for each student si /∈ Sj.
Let us imagine that students are ordered following a common criterion, which
is independent from the schools characteristics and does not depend on the
distance from the students' residence to the school, neither on whether the
students have or not any sibling at the school, or any similar criteria. Then, once
such common priorities have been ﬁxed, each school can modify it by selecting
its ideal set of students, whose size must be not higher than the number of
its available positions, but the rest of (`non-ideal') students must be prioritized
following a common criterion.
We can now establish the following result.
Proposition 5 Let SAP be a School Allocation Problem. If Π satisﬁes CPC,
then it has only one matching being stable and Pareto eﬃcient.
We can deﬁne a condition, similar to CPC, applying to students' character-
istics. This is the essence of CRC.
Deﬁnition 6 We say that the students' rankings matrix Φ satisﬁes the Com-
mon Ranking Condition, CRC in short, if, and only if, it is possible to
ﬁnd a linear order over the set of schools C, described by the ranking ρ =(
ρc1 , . . . , ρcj , . . . , ρcm
)
, such that for each student, si, and school cj,
ρsicj (si) =
{
1 + ρcj if ρck < ρcj
ρcj if ρck > ρcj
where ck is such that ρsick = 1.
To introduce the idea underlying CRC, let us imagine that there is an unam-
biguous way to order the schools (that can be derived from some quality index
that is commonly accepted), but each student has a preferred school due to some
speciﬁc criteria (for instance due to its proximity to the student's residence ad-
dress; or because she has some sibling attending to that school; or because her
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parents studied at that school; etc.) CRP says that all the students will share
the same preferences except that they can diﬀer on which her ideal school is.
Unfortunately, as the next example points out, a result similar to Proposition
5 can not be reached just by assuming that students' ranking satisﬁes CRC. We
need an extra qualiﬁcation, which is that all the students share the opinion on
which her ideal school is.
Example 7 Let us consider a School Allocation Problem involving three stu-
dents and two schools, having one vacant each. Let us assume the ranking and
priorities matrices are
Φ =
 1 22 1
2 1
 ; and Π = [ 2 3 1
1 3 2
]
Note that this School Allocation Problem satisﬁes CRC. Nevertheless, the unique
stable matching is described as µ, where µ (s1) = c2; µ (s2) = c1; and µ (s3) =
s3, which is ineﬃcient. What this example might suggest is that the non ex-
istence of a stable and eﬃcient matching is related to the fact that this School
Allocation Problem is scarce. Nevertheless, it is not true. Just to show it, let is
imagine that there is a new school, c3 and the new problem, consistent with the
previous one, is described by
Φ′ =
 1 2 32 1 3
2 1 3
 ; and Π′ =
 2 3 11 3 2
3 2 1

Note that, for any qc3 ≥ 1, the unique stable matching is µ′, where µ′ (s1) = c2;
µ′ (s2) = c1; and µ′ (s3) = c3.
The next result proposes conditions that, when imposed on students' rank-
ings, guarantee the existence of a stable and Pareto eﬃcient matching.
Proposition 8 Let SAP be a School Allocation Problem. If Φ satisﬁes CRC,
and all the students exhibit the same ranking, then there is a unique stable and
eﬃcient matching.
Let us mention that the CRC was proposed by Alcalde and Barberà (1994)
as an example for Top Dominance, a condition guaranteeing the existence of
strategy-proof stable matching mechanisms for the marriage problem.7 It is
also easy to check that, given the close (formal) relationship between the School
Allocation and the Marriage Problems, CPC is also related to the fulﬁllment of
Top Dominance by the schools' declared preferences (or priorities).
7A marriage problem, as modeled by Gale and Shapley (1962), can be described as a School
Allocation Problem in which all the colleges have just a vacant position.
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Deﬁnition 9 Let Ri be a set of possible rankings for student si. We say that
Ri satisﬁes Student Top Dominance if for each cj and ck in C, and any two
rankings ρsi and ρ
′
si in Ri if ρsicj < ρsick and ρ′sick < ρ′sicj then{
ch ∈ C : ρsich ≤ ρsicj
} ∩ {ch ∈ C : ρ′sich ≤ ρ′sick} = ∅.
Deﬁnition 10 Let cj ∈ C be a school, with admission quota qcj , and Pj be a
set of possible priorities for such a school. We say that Pj satisﬁes School Top
Dominance if there is a set of students Sj ⊂ S, with ∣∣Sj∣∣ ≤ qcj − 1 , such that
for each si and sf in S, and any two priorities picj and pi′cj in Pj if picjsi < picjsf
and pi′cjsf < pi
′
cjsi then{
sh ∈ S : picjsh ≤ picjsi
} ∩ {sh ∈ S : pi′cjsh ≤ pi′cjsf} ⊆ Sj .
The idea that schools have some freedom on how to order their chosen stu-
dents is behind School Top Dominance. But such a freedom is not full range
in the sense that the student which is prioritized to fulﬁll the college's quota
(i.e. picjsi = qcj ) determines which the priority for the rest of students is. In
particular, let us observe that, when qj = 1 for each school cj , the School Top
Dominance introduced in Deﬁnition 10 coincides with the Top Dominance as
deﬁned by Alcalde and Barberà (1994).
The next example points out a general diﬃculty to generalize the notions
of CPC and/or CRC having positive results similar to the ones proposed in
Propositions 5 and 8.
Example 11 Let us consider a School Allocation Problem involving three stu-
dents and three schools, having one vacant each. Let us suppose that schools
priorities are described by matrix, satisfying School Top Dominance,
Π =
 3 2 12 1 3
1 3 2

Now, let us assume that all the students agree that school c2 is their worst
option. In such a case, and when imposing Student Top Dominance, we have
the following two possibilities:
(a) All the students exhibit the same ranking, and
(b) Students might have opposite opinions on how to rank schools c1 and c3.
Note that if the ﬁrst case holds Proposition 8 applies and thus, there is a unique
(assortative) stable matching, which is also Pareto eﬃcient. Nevertheless, if it
is not the case, the rankings matrix might be
Φ =
 1 3 23 1 2
3 1 2

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and the unique stable matching that this problem has is not Pareto eﬃcient.
As a conclusion we can say that when the students exhibit rankings satisfying
Top Dominance and there is a common opinion on ranking some school as the
best one (or the worst one) we can have any of the following two conclusions:
(i) If we add an anonymity condition, as Alcalde and Barberà (1994) proposed,
to the Top Dominance idea, all the students will exhibit the same rank-
ing. Therefore, the conclusion is that there is a unique (assortative) stable
matching which is also eﬃcient, as established in Proposition 8.
(ii) On the contrary, if such an anonymity is not demanded, we cannot guar-
antee the existence of a stable and Pareto eﬃcient matching.
We proposes a way to reformulate how students would be prioritized. As
we have mentioned before students are prioritized following a scoring function
that can be seen as a function which is separable on two classes of variables.
The ﬁrst type of variables lies on the relationship between any student and
each school. Following this conception, it is expected that each student obtains
diﬀerent scores from two schools and also that each school assigns diﬀerent
scores to any two students. Relative to the second class of variables, they are
not related to any school. Therefore, we can identify the score that each student
obtain, from a school, relative to the ﬁrst scoring function, with its score by that
school;8 whereas the score assigned to each student, that does not depend on
their relationship with any school, can be seen as a score assigned by the Local
School Committee. The above interpretation allows us to deﬁne two scoring
functions, to be called the School Scoring Function, CS, and the Local Scoring
Function, LS.
The last question that we deal with, related to this score-based way to build
schools' priority list, lies on how to combine the School Scoring Function and the
Local Scoring Function to deﬁne a Global Scoring Function. Following the idea
beyond the procedure used by the Seattle School Board, let us deﬁne, for each
school, its Priority students as those for which the School Scoring Function
is the relevant function for deciding their score. Therefore, we can formally
describe the Global Score for an student as follows.9
Deﬁnition 12 Let S and C be the sets of students and colleges respectively.
We deﬁne the Global Score Function induced by the School Scoring Function
CS : S×C → <+; the Local Scoring Function LS : S → <+; and the Priority
8Let us remember that the scores are determined by the Local School Committees, and
also that schools do not determine their priority lists. Thus, we are abusing interpretation
when saying that the school determines the score. We hope the reader not to be induced to
confusion due to such an abuse.
9The reader can think on diﬀerent ways to describe a Global Scoring Function by, for
instance, adding the Local and the School Scoring Functions. Nevertheless, what it is rele-
vant to reach our positive results formalized in Theorem 14 is not related to the particular
composition but on the fact that it induces schools priorities satisfying CPC.
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Function P : C → 2S as the function GS : S × C → <+ assigning each
student-school pair the value
GS (si, cj) =
 LS (si) + CS (si, cj) if si ∈ P (cj)
LS (si) otherwise
To introduce the next deﬁnition, for a Local Scoring Function, LS, let M
denote the maximum score allocated to a student,
M = max
si∈S
LS (si) (1)
Deﬁnition 13 Let S and C be the sets of students and colleges respectively,
and let Q be the vector summarizing school's capacities. Given the Scoring
Functions LS, CS; and P , we say that the Scoring Function GS, satisﬁes the
Limited Freedom Condition , LFC henceforth, if it fulﬁlls:
(a) For each school cj, and student si,
CS (si, cj) > M.
(b) For each school cj,
|P (cj)| ≤ qcj , and
(c) For any two students si, sh, si 6= sh,
LS (si) 6= LS (sh) .
Note that, under LFC, the induced priority ordering for a school, if it chooses
the function CS, allows the school to decide which its best students are, to fulﬁll
its available places. Nevertheless, once some student has been declared not to
be one of the qcj -top students, the school's opinion is not taken into account to
determine such a student's priority.
A second aspect that we want to remark is that, even though in our model
each priority ordering is linear, Deﬁnition 13 allows that some students, in the
qcj ﬁrst positions, share the same priority. Note that this fact does not inﬂuence
the stability of any matching, even though if it considers that all those students
are equaled prioritized. The reader is refer to Ehler and Erdil (2010) for a full
characterization of Stable and Eﬃcient allocations in this environment.
Theorem 14 Let S and C be the sets of students and colleges respectively, and
let Q be the school's capacities vector. Then for each Scoring Function GS that
satisﬁes LFC, and any SAP = {S, C; Φ,Π, Q}, where priorities are induced by
GS, there exists a unique stable and Pareto eﬃcient matching.
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Note that Theorem 14 establishes that LFC is a suﬃcient condition to guar-
antee the existence of matchings conciliating the notions of stability and Pareto
eﬃciency. Let us remark that the usual way to prioritize students comes from
the employ of some scoring rule. These functions are usually expressed as the
addition of two scoring functions. The ﬁrst one just takes into account the
particular characteristics of the students, isolated from the schools, whereas the
second one lies on each student's characteristics related to the considered school.
This additively separable functional form follows the shape used in Deﬁnition
13.
We would like to point out that it is very hard to ﬁnd a result establishing
necessary conditions conciliating stability and Pareto eﬃciency. In particular,
if each student is free to rank any school as her best school, it is always possi-
ble to ﬁnd non-scarce problems having a stable and Pareto eﬃcient matching.
Just, consider that students rankings are such that, for each school cj the num-
ber of students for which this school is the ﬁrst-ranked, i.e. ρsicj = 1, is not
greater than qcj . In such a case, no matter which the matrix Π is, the matching
that associates each student her best school is both stable and Pareto eﬃcient.
Therefore, if conditions are established on individual characteristics, it is very
hard to have in mind natural necessary conditions guaranteeing the existence
of a stable and Pareto eﬃcient matching.
4 Concluding Remarks
Let us start this section by quoting the paper by Abdulkadiro§lu et al. (2005).
Recent Developments Section.
A memorandum from Superintendent Payzant in December 2004
states that BPS plans to change the computerized process used to
assign students to schools. Although the task-force report recom-
mended that BPS adopt the TTC assignment algorithm, the School
Committee is interested in simulations of both mechanisms and
in understanding the extent of preference manipulation under the
Boston mechanism. They are also thinking through their philosoph-
ical position on the trade-oﬀ between stability and eﬃciency.
This interest for deﬁning a philosophical approach on the trade-oﬀ between
stability and eﬃciency is at the origin of a modiﬁcation in the mechanism used
in the Boston Area, decided by July 2005, see Abdulkadiro§lu et al. (2006).
As these authors mention, the solution was to adopt a deferred acceptance
mechanism because it is strategy-proof. Nevertheless, as we have pointed out
in the present paper, this solution is far from solving the trade-oﬀ which is at
the origin of this reform. In fact the employ of such a solution can be justiﬁed
because it considers that stability is the central issue. If, moreover, the best
that agents can do is to reveal their true characteristics, it is straightforward
to conclude, as the Boston School Committee did, that the Student-Optimal
Stable mechanism would be adopted.
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The main conclusion of this paper is to provide a ways to avoid the eﬃciency-
equity dilemma. It allows to slightly modify the last reform introduced by the
Boston School Committee, comes from redeﬁning how the schools inﬂuence on
designing which students are prioritized. In this sense, the solution comes from
the use of scoring rules that, applied to the students' characteristics, fulﬁll our
Limited Freedom Condition.
Appendix
I. Proof for Propositions 5 and 8. To prove Propositions 5 and 8, let us start
by establishing some claims that will be helpful to understand the structure of
stable and eﬃcient matchings.
Claim 15 Let SAP be a School Allocation Problem. Then it has, at most, one
stable and eﬃcient matching.
Proof. First of all, and following Martínez et al. (2001), let us note the set of
stable matchings has a lattice structure. The operators proposed by Martínez
et al. (2001) to prove such a structure are just the students' rankings and the
schools' priorities. Therefore, if a stable matching µ is eﬃcient for SAP, it must
be the student optimal stable matching.
Claim 16 Let SAP be a School Allocation Problem, and µ be a stable matching
for it. Then µ is eﬃcient if, and only if, there is no (non-empty) ordered set of
students {
s1, . . . , si, . . . , sk
} ⊆ S, such that
(a) µ
(
si
) ∈ C for all si ∈ S, and
(b) each student si ranks her mate as worse than her next-in-the-order stu-
dent's mate,
ρsiµ(si+1) < ρsiµ(si) for each i < k, and ρskµ(s1) < ρskµ(sk).
Proof. First of all, let us note that if there exists a set of students fulﬁlling the
statement of Claim 16, it is easy to see that the matching is not eﬃcient. To see
that, given a matching µ, let us construct µ′ such that µ′ (si) = µ (si) for each
si /∈
{
s1, . . . , si, . . . , sk
}
and for any student si in such a set, µ′
(
si
)
= µ
(
si+1
)
,
modulo k. Note that µ′ Pareto dominates µ. On the other hand, let us assume
that µ is a stable matching that fails to be eﬃcient. Then, there should be
another matching µ′ that dominates µ. This is equivalent to say that µ′ 6= µ
and, for each student si such that µ′ (si) 6= µ (si), ρsiµ′(si) < ρsiµ(si). Let s1 be a
student such that µ′
(
s1
) 6= µ (s1). Note that, by the Decomposition Lemma,10
10See, for instance Gale and Sotomayor (1985). Note that Martínez et al. (2000) pointed
out that this results is still valid in our framework.
12
and provided that µ is stable, it must be the case that µ
(
s1
) 6= s1. Let denote
µ′
(
s1
)
= c1 ∈ C. Since µ is stable, and ρs1c1 < ρs1µ(s1), it must be the case that∣∣µ (c1)∣∣ = qc1 . Therefore, there should be a student, say s2 ∈ µ (c1) \ µ′ (c1).
Since µ′ Pareto dominates µ, and µ
(
s2
) 6= µ (s2), there should be an school,
say c2 such that µ′
(
s2
)
= c2. Note that if µ
(
s1
)
= c2 the result is proved.
Otherwise, there should be a student, say s3 ∈ µ (c2) \ µ′ (c2). Let us observe
that if µ′
(
c3
)
= µ
(
c1
)
, the result follows. Otherwise, since the set of students
is ﬁnite, an iterative argument yields the desired result.
We can now proceed to prove Propositions 5 and 8.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Let SAP be a School Allocation Problem. Let us assume that Π satisﬁes CPC.
By Claim 15 we now that, if there is a stable and Pareto eﬃcient matching, it
must be µSO, the student optimal stable matching. Since µSO is stable, let us
assume that it is not eﬃcient.
Then, by Claim 16, there must be a matching µ′, and an ordered set of
students, say
{
s1, . . . , si, . . . , sk
}
= S ′, such that for each si ∈ S ′, ρsiµ′(si) <
ρsiµSO(si), with µ
′ (si) = µSO (si+1) for each i ≤ k− 1, and µ′ (sk) = µSO (s1).
Since µS is stable, we have that, for each student si ∈ S ′,
(a) piµSO(si+1)si > qµSO(si+1); and
(b) piµSO(si+1)si > piµSO(si+1)si+1 .
where sk+1 = s1.
By CPC, there must be a priorities order pi such that, for each school cj ∈ C,
and any two students si, sh such that min
{
picjsi , picjsh
}
> qcj , it holds that[
picjsi < picjsh
]⇔ [pisi < pish ] .
Therefore, by CPC and stability of µ, we have that
pis1 < · · · < pisi < pisi+1 < · · · < pisk < pis1 ,
which contradicts that pi might represent a priorities order.
Proof of Proposition 8.
Let SAP be a School Allocation Problem. Let us assume that Φ satisﬁes CRC,
relative to ρ, which is the ranking that all the students exhibit. Note that, in
such a case it is straightforward to see that there is a unique stable matching,
which is also Pareto eﬃcient.
This matching can be obtained in a simple sequential way. If we denote by
ct ∈ C the t-th college according ρ, we proceed as follows:
(1) µS
(
c1
)
= {si ∈ S : pic1si ≤ qc1};
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(2) µS
(
c2
)
is the set containing the qc2 prioritized students, according to pic2 ,
that are not in µS
(
c1
)
; . . .
(t) µS (ct) is the set containing the qct prioritized students, according to pict ,
that are not in µS
(
ch
)
for any h < t.
It is easy to see that this assortative matching is both stable and eﬃcient.
II. Proof for Theorem 14.
To prove Theorem 14, let us consider a School Allocation Problem. Let us
assume that there is a `scoring function' GS : S ×C → < inducing the priorities
matrix Π. Note that this is equivalent to say that for each cj ∈ C, and any two
students si and sh in S, picjsi < picjsh whenever GS (si, cj) > GS (sh, cj).
Let us assume that GS satisﬁes LFC. Then there are three functions LS : S →
<+, P : C → 2S , and CS : S × C → <+ decomposing GS as established in
Deﬁnition 13.
For function LS given, let us deﬁne the `common priority' pi as
pisi = |{sh ∈ S : LS (sh) ≥ LS (si)}| .
Then, since GS satisﬁes LFC, and, for each cj ∈ C, picj is induced by LFC, it
follows that Π satisﬁes CPC related to pi. Thus, as Proposition 5 establishes,
SAP has a unique stable and eﬃcient matching.
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